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In tl1e ~tlpt·e•••e Court of the 
State of Utah 
FIRST SECURITY BANK OF UTAH, ) 
N. A., a corporation, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
\ 
vs. ( 
EDWARD H. BATES, ) 
Defendant and Appellant. 
CASE 
NO. 9926 
Appellant's Petition for Rehearing, end 
Brief i~1 Support Thereof 
APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Appellant, Edward H. Bates, petitions the Court for 
rehearing in this case upon the grormds hereinafter set 
forth. 
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In support of said Petition, appellant relies upon the 
following points: 
POINT I 
THE REASONS GIVEN BY TillS COURT IN ITS 
OPINION ARE INSUFFICIENT SINGLY 0'R COLLEC-
TIVELY TO WARRANT THE CONCLUSION THAT 
THE DEED WAS NOT DELIVERED. 
POINT ll 
NONE OF THE CASES CITED BY THIS C0'URT 
ARE FACTUALLY IN POINT. 
POINT m 
THIS CO,URT HELD IN A CASE WHERE THE 
FACTS WERE MUCH MORE INDICATIVE OF A TES-
TAMENTARY TRANSACTION THAN IN THIS CASE, 
THAT THERE WAS A VALID DELIVERY OF THE 
DEED. AND THAT THE TRANSACTION WAS NOT 
TESTAMENTARY IN NATURE. 
WHEREFORE, appellant prays that his petition for 
rehearing 'be granted and that upon such rehearing, and 
after consideration of the record, and the law, the decision 
of the Court be recalled, and a decision rendered in favor 
of the appeHant. 
DAVE McMULLIN 
DALLAS H. YOUNG, JR. 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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IJIU~t., IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR REHEARING 
POINT I 
THE REASONS GIVEN BY THIS COURT IN ITS 
OPINION ARE INSUFFICIENT SINGLY OR COLLEC-
TIVELY TO WARRANT THE CONCLUSION THAT 
THE DEED WAS NOT DELIVERED. 
An analysis of this Court's opinion shows that this 
Court held there was no delivery of the deed and that the 
\Vhole transaction was testamentary in nature and violated 
the Statute of \Vilis for the following reasons: 
1. Willis Bates told Thelma Vest not to tell Ted 
about the deed until after his death. 
2. Willis Bates sold the automobile described in the 
so-called Bill of Sale or Assignment. 
3. Thelma Vest returned the deed to Willis Bates 
on two occasions when she she was going to California and 
upon her return Willis Bates returned the deed to her. 
4. Ted's wife died in 1956 and he remarried in 1960, 
to a woman Willis did not want to share in his property. 
On learning of the marriage, Willis sought out Miss Vest, 
telling her that if Ted was married to her at the time of 
the delivery of the deed, Miss Vest was to see that Ted 
deeded the property to Ted's children; that Willis again 
told her the same thing shortly before he died in 1962. 
5. Miss Vest stated that had she returned the deed to 
Willis, he would have been at liberty to keep them and 
that she \vas willing to return it upon request. 
6. Willis continued in possession of the place and 
paid the taxes thereon. 
7. Willis and Miss Vest were close friends. 
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4 
On this basis, the Court concluded there was an agen-
cy, that there was no effective delivery of the deed, and 
that Wilis intended to retain control o[ the deed and hence 
his actions were ineffeiCtive to transfer any interest in 
praesenti. 
The Court, in the opening paragraph, states: "The 
following is a fair abstract of the evidence in a trial to 
the Court, canvassed more favovably to plaintiff in accor-
dance with customary appellate review.'' 
We submit that this rule applies only where there is 
a dispute of facts and in this ease there is no dispute of 
facts and we, therefore, set fortll evidence which the Court 
.. 
fails to mention. 
When Willis went to see Miss Vest on November 14, 
1949, at which time he asked 'her to make a deed, he said, 
"Could you help me make ,the deed in the event that any-
thing 'happened to me, that Ted could have my home?'' 
He said, "I have done much for Lewis, who is the 
principal of the high schooL I educated Walter." He said, 
"I have never done much for Ted and he is the baby of the 
fam.ily." He said, "I have always felt compassionate to-
wards Ted and I have always. felt that I would like to do 
more for him if ever I was in a position to do it." He~ said, 
''He is ,married and has had kind of a rough time so'', he 
said, "If you will help me with this, I will appreciate it." 
He said, "Then if you would hold this for me, I will ap-
preciate that too." He said, "In the event anything hap-
pens to me, you give it to Ted, but I don't want Ted to 
know that you have this document unless something hap-
pens to me.'' 
Willis never once in the 13 years that Miss Vest held 
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the deed ever asked for its return. Willis never asked Miss 
Vest to make a deed to anyone else. 
When Willis Bates sought out Miss Vest, upon learn-
ing of Ted's marriage in 1960, Miss Vest urged him to 
see a lawyer and make a Will, and Willis would not do so. 
When Willis delivered the deed to Miss Vest, he said 
nothing which indicated that he reserved the right to 
withdraw or change the same. 
None of this evidence \Vas disputed or rebutted. 
This Court says that the Utah authorities cited by 
defendant in each case was different factually and this 
was also true of cases cited from sister states. In view 
of this statement, we will discuss the points mentioned 
above in the order in which they appear and cite cases 
in which these points have been ruled upon by this State 
and other courts. 
1. Willis Bates told Miss Vest not to tell Ted about 
the deed until after his death. See American Law of Prop-
erty, Vol. 3, Sec. 12.67, page 31. We quote: 
"Practically all of the deliveries of deeds to custodians 
considered to this point depend solely upon directions 
of the grantor to the custodian. Whatever contract 
exists is between these two, and often the grantee 
knows nothing of the matter until the second delivery." 
Quoting from 26 C.J.S., Deeds, Section 46, page 703: 
"It is not essential to a valid delivery that the grantee 
knew of ·the existence of the deed before the grantor's 
'death." (Emphasis added.) 
To the same effect, see Brandt v. Brandt, 260 Pac. 
342, and Neeley v. Buster, 195 Pac. 736. Also see Burn-
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ham, et al. v. Eschler, 116 Urtah 61, 208 P. 2d 96. 
It might well be that Willis may have been prompted 
in wanting the matter kept secret to avoid hectoring by 
the very people who caused this action to be instigated. 
2. We are at a loss to understand that this Court 
thinks it significant that Willis sold the automobile. We 
do not know its age on January 14, 1949, but it was at 
least nine years old when he disposed of it, and we submit 
that if the land in question had disappeared by reason of 
an earthquake or by erosion, then we would never have 
laid claim to it. Further, in this connection, so far as we 
know all Courts hold that one who purchases property 
without knowing of the gift 'has superior rights to the 
' donee. We .have always felt that Ted Bates' rights were 
determined by what occUITed on November 14, 1949, and 
the fact that Willis Bates indieated in 1958 that he wan-
ted Ted to have the new car makes no difference; the old 
car having been disposed of, we had no rights to it or to 
the one received in exchange for it. 
3. The custodian returned the deed to Willis Bates 
on two occasions. On this question, see Cell v. Drake, 100 
P. 2d 949, (Idaho) in which the Court said: 
''In this case the custodian ·had the deed about a year 
and a half. The maker of the deed then went to the 
custodian of the deed and demanded and received its 
return and that was the last the custodian saw of it. 
The maker of the deed testified that he never saw the 
deed thereafter. The court: 'The fact that the de-
positary returned to the grantor on demand does not 
affect the legal status whatever. He was bound by 
the instructions given him at the time the deed was 
deposited with him.' " 
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Also see Gappmayer v. Wilkenson, 53 Utah 236, 177 
Pac. 763. In that case this Court held that a later return 
of the deed to the grantor made no difference; that there 
was a valid delivery of the deed. 
4. Ted's wife died in 1956 and he remarried in 1960, 
to a woman Willis did not want to share in the property 
described in the deed. On learning of the marriage, Willis 
sought out Miss Vest telling her that if Ted was married 
to her at the time of the delivery of the deed, Miss Vest 
was to see that Ted deeded the property to his children; 
that Ted told her the same thing again prior to his death 
in 1962. 
We will treat this question more fully under Point m 
when we consider what this Court said in O'Gara v. 
Findlay, 6 Utah 2d 102; 251 P. 2d 597 and at this time con-
tent ourselves to making the following observations. 
When did this transaction become testamentary in 
nature? Certainly under all of the decisions of this Court 
had Willis Bartes died prior to 1960 this Court would have 
been required to hold that the deed had been delivered. 
Can it be said that when Willis learned of Ted's marriage 
in 1960 and went to Miss Vest and stated that he was 
upset by reason of the marriage and she urged him to 
make a will and he did not do so, did this transaction then 
become testamentary in nature? If rthat question be ans-
wered in the negative, was it because what ·was said by 
Willis a few days prior to his death to Miss Vest? In fair-
ness to the bench, 1he lawyers and the citizenry of this 
State. we believe this Court, if it is to declare this delivery 
of the deed to be testamentary in nature, has a duty to 
state just when it became testamentary in nature. If the 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
8 
Court should say that it was testamentary in nature from 
its inception, then we again say that the bench, the bar 
and the citizenry of this State are entitled to have author-
ity cited in support of such a conclusion. And if this Court 
says that it was testamentary by reason orf what happened 
after January 14, 1949, then it should say irt is o~erruling 
O'Gara v. Findlay, supra. 
5. The Court seems guided to some extent in its 
opinion by the fact that Miss Vest said she would have 
returned the deed to Willis had he requested it and thart: 
he would have been at liberty to keep it. We have found 
no case and we doubt that any can be found which holds 
that what a custodian was willing to do in such a case as 
this has anything to do with delivery or non-delivery of a 
deed. The test in all the cases is what was the intent of 
the dono~ and what he said and did. No matter what Miss 
Vest was willing to do, the fact remains that Willis Bates, 
during thirteen years that Miss Vest had possession of the 
deed, never art any time asked for its return. 
This Court said, in Lossee v. Jones, 120 Utah 385, 235 
P. 2d 132, that where a deed had been delivered by a 
mother to her daughter, "Nor does the daughter's statement 
that if the mother had changed her mind and wanted the 
deeds back she would have given them to her necessarily 
affect the question orf delivery." 
This is a sound and salutary rule. To depart from it 
could have the effect of permitting an aggrieved relative 
of the donor to exert pressure upon the eustodian to state 
that the custodian was always ready to retun1 the deed 
to the donor and thereby defeat the objects of the donor. 
6. The fact that Willis continued in occupancy of 
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the premises and paid the taxes thereon is no proof of non-
delivery. The last case which passes upon that question 
is O'Gara v. Findlay, supra. In that case the donor r~ 
mained in possession of the property, paid taxes upon it 
and lived thereon, and this Court held there was nothing 
about that to prove that the transaction was testamentary 
in nature. An earlier case holding to the same effect is 
Chamberlain v. Larsen, 83 Utah 420, 29 P. 2d 355. We 
quote from that case: 
''That the grantor, after- the execution of the deed, con-
tinued to pay the taxes on the property, carried the 
insurance in her name, and expr~d to variQ\lS per-
sons a desire to sell a part of the property is not, when 
the relationship existing between the ~ra,ntor and gran-
tee is taken into consideration, inconsistent with an 
actual delivery of the deed.'' 
7. Surely the fact that Willis and Miss Vest were 
close friends is not evidence that the transaction was of a 
testamentary nature. If that is the rule, then lawyers, in 
advising their clients as to what to do in the event that 
the client wants to make a gift of his property, should in-
struct them to seek out a stranger or an enemy as custo-
dian of their deed. We have found no authority which 
holds that depositing a deed with a close friend is indica-
tive of a testamentary transaction. 
We submit that none of the reasons set forth py thi~ 
Court, either singly or collectively, afford tbe basis of de-
claring that the deed was not delivered on January 1~, 
1949. 
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POINT II 
NO'NE OF THE CASES Cl'I'EID BY TillS COURT 
ARE FACTUALLY IN POINT. 
We agree, as stated in the opinion of the Court, that 
each case must be decided on its own facts, and that is all 
we ask that be done in this case. We believe if that is done 
and this Court follows the law enunciated by this Court 
over a long period of years beginning with the case of Wool-
ley v. Taylor, 45 Utah 227, 144 P. 1094, and followed by 
the cases of Wilson v. Wilson, 32 Utah 169, 89 Pac. 643; 
Gappmayer v. Wilkenson, supra; Singleton v. Kelly, 61 Utah 
277, 212 Pac. 63; Lossee v. Jones, supra, and O'Gara v. 
Findlay, supra, then this Court will have to conclude that 
there was a valid delivery of the deed in this ease. 
The authorities cited by this ·Court in support of its 
decision are different factually and are not in point. The 
Alexander v. Zion's Savings Bank case, 2 Utah 2d. 317, 
273 P. 2d. 173; 4 Utah 2d 90, 287 P. 2d 665 deals solely 
with the interpretation of a trust agreement and never even 
mentions the question of delivery of deeds. 
In the Snodgrass case cited by the Court, there was 
only one witness, as there was only one witness in this 
case, concerning the instructions and actions of the de-
ceased relative to a delivery of the deeds, and that witness, 
a Mr. OoHins, testified that John S. Snodgrass had left the 
deeds and Will with him simply for saf~keeping and with-
out instructions. This question was asked of this witness: 
"Did he (meaning Snodgrass) tell you to personally see 
that you delivered those deeds to Rachael Rice, Minnie E. 
Pierce and George L. Snodgrass respectively. Answer that 
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yes or no." Answer: .. He did not. That's all I remem-
ber about it." 
POINT ill 
THIS COURT HELD IN A CASE WHERE THE 
FAcrS WERE MUCH MORE INDICATIVE OF A TES-
TAI\1ENTARY TRANSACTION THAN IN THIS CASE, 
THAT THERE WAS A VALID DELIVERY OF THE 
DEED AND THAT THE TRANSACTIOIN WAS NOT 
TESTAMENTARY IN NATURE. 
The Court says in its opinion that none of the oases 
cited by the defendant raised or treated the matter of the 
statute of wills. We agree with that statement. We cited 
no cases because we felt that the cases cited by us were 
in point and were decisive of the matter as was decided by 
this Court in the case of O'Gara v. findlay, supra. 
We call attention to the facts in tne O'Gara v. Find-
lay case in which the Court held that the transaction was 
not testamentary in nature. In the O'Gara v. :Findlay case, 
the decedent went to her bank and instructed a Mr. Gailey 
to prepare a deed. The decedent said that sl}e wanted to 
make a deed to defendant that he was to $ell the land any 
time after her death and distribute the money to certain 
designated persons. The deed was put. in an envelope and 
a separate sheet of instructions as to the distribution of 
the proceeds of the sale of the property was also included 
in the envelope with the deed. Between the execution and 
delivery of the deed and her death, the grantor remained 
in possession of the property, paid taxes upon it and lived 
thereon. She also cllanged the first list of instructions 
several times, always, however, referring tD the execution 
and delivery of the deed in the past tense. Shortly after 
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the grantor went to the hospital for her final illness, de-
fendant contacted her to discorver whether or nort: she had 
any final instructions for him relative to this property. 
Upon these facts, the plaintiff contended that the entire 
scheme showed an intent to make a testamentary transfeT 
of the property and not a present conveyance thereof and 
in support of its contention, ·Cited First security Bank of 
Utah v. Burgi, 122 Utah 445, 251 P. 2d 297. Then the 
Court recites the facts in the Burgi ease and we quote 
from the Court's opinion: 
"In that case the grantor decedent had operated 
a grocery store and rthe deed in question conveyed that 
property to grantor's son. There was also some evi-
dence that the grantee son had taken some active part 
in the business operations. The grantee testified that 
the deed had been delivered to him, and that he had 
waited until after the death of his father to record it. 
This evidence was ,contradicted by other testimony 
to the effect that the son upon his father's death con-
fiscated the keys to the store vault, saying that there 
was a deed in there he was going to get and record 
and that the son had refused to allow 'anyone else to 
be present when he opened the said vault. Upon that 
conflicting evidence, the trial eourt found that no de-
livery had been made, and this eourt upheld the find-
ing. 
"Nor does the fact that Mrs. Hirigaray periodi-
cally ·change her instructions to defendant as to dis-
position of the property after her death negative an 
unconditional delivery of the deed itself. The question 
of whether the delivery of the property to defendant 
was in trust fo~ others is not at issue in this case, nor 
does defendant now contend that he is the beneficial 
owner of all the property in question. 
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"This court has held on similar facts and on other 
facts not nearly so clear that a valid delivery of a deed 
had been effected ... " 
CONCLUSION 
As stated before, we agree that each case should be 
decided upon its own facts. We also believe that rules of 
law applicable to the facts ought to have some degree of 
stability. We assert that if this Court follows the long 
line of cases decided by it on the question of delivery of 
deeds and the case cited on the testamentary nature of this 
transaction, then the judgment entered by the trial court 
should be reversed 'and judgment entered for the defend-
ant 
Respectfully submitted, 
DAVE McMULLIN 
20 East Utah Avenue 
Payson, Utah 
DALLAS H. YOUNG, JR. 
48 North University Avenue 
Provo, Utah 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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